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WAIVER OF IMMUNITY-
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
ROBERT E. PARELLA*
R EALISTICALLY, ours is a government of laws and men, of insti-
tutions and personalities. Presently it seems that our institu-
tions and establishments are under an attack that is unparalleled in
terms of its sources and intensity. Yet, in the political process, the
communications media and other forces have focused attention, as
never before, on the men and personalities. Similarly, many who are
critical of the institutions would be content with new men in those
same institutions. For those who inhabit the rank and file, confidence
in the integrity of public officials is often more important than
institutions or issues.
The legal system faces these grave matters when it is called
upon to determine permissible standards for dismissal of public
employees. The present discussion is concerned with striking a
delicate balance between the interest of the individual in freedom
from self-incrimination and the need of the state to protect itself
against corrupt influences within its institutions. The relation of
freedom from compulsory self-incrimination to individual liberty is
firmly established as the law of the land. Yet public confidence in
the integrity of officials must be the highest order of business-an
ideal, central to democracy, that is at once simplistic in formulation
and yet inscrutable with respect to its attainment. Realization of the
ideal is obstructed by many forces-among them public judgment
that is often hasty or emotional, and inability or unwillingness to make
distinctions that are important in law. A publicized scandal involving
prosecution or discipline of an official can evoke public response that
is either cynical or sanguine. Still we must persevere in expecting
*A.B. St. Peter's College (1957); LL.B. New York University (1960);
Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University.
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and demanding much of our public
officials in order to insure that our ideal
contributes to the "sober second thought
of the community, which is the firm base
on which all law must ultimately rest." 1
With Gardner v. Broderick2 the
Supreme Court has finally resolved the
principal confusion surrounding dismissal
of public employees and, at once, has
added an important page to the continu-
ing exegesis of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Gardner, a New York
City patrolman, was called before a
grand jury which was investigating
alleged bribery and corruption of police
officers. He was advised that he would
be examined concerning the perfor-
mance of his official duties and was
asked to sign a waiver of immunity after
being told that he would be fired if he
refused. He refused to sign and after
an administrative hearing he was dis-
charged from public office as provided in
the New York City Charter.3
Gardner then brought an Article 78
proceeding seeking reinstatement. The
lower court dismissed the petition and
the New York Court of Appeals affirmed
in a unanimous opinion.4 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the "man-
date of the great privilege against self-
incrimination does not tolerate the
attempt, regardless of its ultimate
effectiveness, to coerce a waiver of the
immunity it confers on penalty of the
loss of employment." 5 In a most
' Stone, The Common Law in the United States,
50 HARv. L. REV. 4, 25 (1936).
2 - U.S. - (1968).
3N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1123.
4 20 N.Y.2d 227, 229 N.E.2d 184, 282 N.Y.S.
2d 487 (1967).
5 - U.S. -, - (1968).
important dictum the Court added that
the privilege would not bar dismissal if
appellant had refused "to answer
questions specifically, directly, and
narrowly relating to the performance of
his official duties, without being required
to waive his immunity with respect to
the use of his answers or the fruits there-
of in a criminal prosecution of himself." 6
The law in this area was formerly
dominated by the pithy statement of
Holmes that one "may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman." 7
The Holmes dictum readily reduced it-
self to the right-privilege formulation
and thus the conclusion that public
employment must be accepted on what-
ever terms are offered. This conclusion
was fortified with respect to waiver of
immunity because the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment was not
applicable to the states until 1964.8 The
states were free to interpret their own
constitutional provisions as they saw fit.9
The Slochower decision1 ° initiated the
evolution of the present law although the
direction it charted was temporarily
reversed. A New York City college pro-
fessor had invoked the fifth amendment
before an investigating committee of the
United States Senate and was discharged
from his position. The Court held that
61d. at -.
7McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155
Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
8 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
9Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
'0Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350
U.S. 551 (1956).
the summary dismissal violated due
process.
In the five years after Slochower the
pendulum was first suspended and then
returned to its point of beginning as the
Court sustained dismissals of a teacher,
subway conductor, and social worker.'1
Beilan and Lerner are distinguishable
because the refusals to answer were be-
fore state interrogating bodies, but not
so with Nelson. Quite apart from such
distinctions, the Court, in all three cases,
emphasized the findings of "incom-
petency," "unreliability," and "insubor-
dination" as the predicates for dismissal
rather than the imputation of a sinister
meaning to the exercise of a constitu-
tional right. At this juncture the law on
the subject was semantically balanced on
the Slochower and Nelson holdings-two
decisions rather patently in conflict.
Effectiveness of state disciplinary
measures seemed to turn upon craftsman-
ship in legislative drafting or in the
framing of judicial and administrative
findings.
Subsequently, in 1964, Malloy v.
Hogan - established freedom from com-
pulsory self-incrimination as a funda-
mental right, guaranteed through the
fourteenth amendment against state
infringement. Three years later, Garrity
v. New Jersey's and Spevack v. Klein14
were decided together, completing the
prelude to Gardner. Garrity involved
an investigation conducted by the New
11Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399
(1958); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958);
Nelson v. Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
"2378 U.S. 1 (1964).
1 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
14385 U.S. 511 (1967).
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Jersey Attorney General. Police officers
were called to testify after a warning that
refusal would subject them to removal
from office. They answered the questions
put to them and some of the answers were
used in subsequent criminal prosecutions.
The Court held that the convictions must
be reversed because the answers were
tantamount to involuntary confessions.
"The option to lose their means of
livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-
incrimination is the antithesis of free
choice to speak out or to remain
silent." 15 Spevack, on the other hand,
was a proceeding to disbar an attorney
for refusal to produce demanded finan-
cial records and to testify at the judicial
inquiry. In the judgment of the Court
the threat of disbarment was a form of
impermissible compulsion to make the
lawyer relinquish his privilege.
It was six months later that the New
York Court of Appeals unanimously
affirmed the dismissal in Gardner.1 6 The
Court reasoned that frankness and candor
in discussing performance of duties can
be demanded of those who would
remain in public office. Garrity was dis-
tinguished as a criminal prosecution and
Spevack as involving one not an employee
of the state. The reversal in the Supreme
Court, without dissent,"1 obscures both
the reason for the path chosen by the
New York Court and also the strong
temptation to pursue that path. After all,
the text of the fifth amendment does
speak of criminal cases and the separate
15 385 U.S. at 497.
16 20 N.Y.2d 227, 229 N.E.2d 184, 282 N.Y.S.
2d 487 (1967).
17 Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a short concurring
opinion for himself and Mr. Justice Stewart.
Mr. Justice Black concurred in the result.
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classification of public employees is
analytically appealing and functionally
manageable as a standard of decision.
Nonetheless, for the reasons appearing
in the balance of this paper, it is believed
that the logic of the Supreme Court is
preferable to the logic of the Court of
Appeals.
The Gardner decision, with its broad
implications, is welcomed not so much
for its rejection of the right-privilege
distinction but rather for its failure to
pay even lip-service to it. Instead the
Court assumes the premise advanced in
Slochower:
To state that a person does not have a
constitutional right to government employ-
ment is only to say that he must comply
with reasonable, lawful, and nondiscrimi-
natory terms laid down by the proper
authorities.1 s
Privilege may be exercised in appoint-
ment to some offices. But our point of
departure here should be that it is no
proper function of a public official to
bestow or withhold privilege, to exercise
the power of a public trust as a matter
of grace. The privilege concept produces
a tolerance of arbitrary and oppressive
action and accepts a mechanical label-
ling process in place of analysis. The
category of public employment cannot be
consigned, ipso facto, to Holmes' dictum
on the strength of the ambivalent argu-
ments that it is, on the one hand,
special and apart, and, on the other, that
government should enjoy the same free-
1S Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350
U.S. 551, 555 (1956).
dom to hire and fire as a private
employer. As to the former, the expan-
sion of governmental activity today, and
especially its economic role as employer,
exerts a far-reaching influence upon
individuals. Government recruits, trains
and accepts the long-term commitment
to employ for which there may be
little, if any, private counterpart. There
is little justification for a view of public
employment that demeans and denies the
dignity of such labor. As to the latter
argument, government should not be free
to hire and fire like any private employer
simply because it does not, in fact, hire
and fire like any private employer. It
has powers, sanctions and stigmas un-
available to the private sector. Thus it
well may be, as stated by Mr. Justice
Brennan in dissent, that
a probationary employee can constitution-
ally be discharged without specification of
reasons at all; and this Court has not
held that it would offend the Due Process
Clause, without more, for a State to put
its entire civil service on such a basis,
if as a matter of internal polity it could
stand to do so.19
Of course, in the present context of self-
incrimination and waiver of immunity,
the hypothesis is beside the point.
The theme of Garrity and Spevack is
that the public employee, and the lawyer,
are entitled to "first-class citizenship" and
not a "watered-down version of constitu-
tional rights." The implications of this
theme augurs well for those whose lives are
19,Nelson v. Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1, 16
(1960).
dramatically affected by public insti-
tutions, whether educational, housing, so-
cial service or others. Fortunately, the
law has already begun movement away
from right-privilege question-begging in
resolving these problems-a likely chal-
lenge for the legal system in the next
decade.20
The generalizations offered above, how-
ever, are insufficient for analytical evalu-
ation of Gardner and its contribution to
the policy embodied in the fifth amend-
ment. Especially troublesome is the
formula, perhaps compromise, in the
Court's dictum that the privilege would
not bar dismissal if the employee refuses
to answer questions "specifically, directly,
and narrowly relating to the performance
of his official duties." 21 Nelson, read
alongside Slochower, was unsatisfactory
in that it sanctioned a semantic resolution
of the issue-if the state characterized re-
fusal to answer as "insubordination" or
"unreliability" it was not exacting a price
for exercise of a constitutional right. Is
Gardner itself formalistic? The opinion
of Mr. Justice Fortas indicates why the
demand for execution of a document pur-
porting to waive constitutional rights is
not tolerated:
It is clear that petitioner's testimony was
demanded before the grand jury in part
so that it might be used to prosecute him,
and not solely for the purpose of securing
20 See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
21 Gardner v. Broderick, - U.S. ,
(1968).
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an accounting of his performance of his
public trust. If the latter had been the
only purpose, there would have been no
reason to seek to compel petitioner to
waive his immunity.22
But the opinion does not explain the
conclusory statement that dismissal can
follow refusal to answer specific ques-
tions-and why such dismissal is not
"costly" 21 and therefore an impermissible
limitation of the constitutional right. For
this we must turn to the interests served
by the fifth amendment.
The privilege against self-incrimination
has been characterized as "one of the
great landmarks in man's struggle to
make himself civilized." 24 Mr. Justice
Goldberg summarized the breadth of the
interests touched by the privilege:
It reflects many of our fundamental values
and most noble aspirations: our unwill-
ingness to subject those suspected of crime
to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt; our preference for
an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial
system of criminal justice; our fear that
self-incriminating statements will be
elicited by inhumane treatment and
abuses; our sense of fair play which dic-
tates 'a fair state-individual balance by
requiring the government to leave the
individual alone until good cause is shown
for disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the in-
dividual to shoulder the entire load' . . . ;
our respect for the inviolability of the
human personality and of the right of
22 Id. at -.
2 3 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614
(1965).
24 E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT To-
DAY 7 (1955).
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each individual 'to a private enclave where
he may lead a private life' . . . ; our dis-
trust of self-deprecatory statements; and
our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is often
'a protection to the innocent.' 25
This complex of values can be reduced
to three broad categories: an abhorrence
and distrust of coerced testimony; an
interest of privacy; a host of rules or
values commonly associated with pro-
cedural due process. Yet in the midst of
the flowering of the fifth amendment since
1964, the majority opinion in Schmerber
v. California26 cautions that the scope of
the privilege does not coincide with the
complex of values it helps to protect.
Also illustrative is the government's need
to gather information and the enigmatic
"required-records" doctrine announced in
Shapiro v. United States27 in 1948 and
further clarified only this year.2 8
Dean McKay has recently scrutinized
the wealth of precedent and literature in
the area.2 9 He rejects many of the com-
ponents of this "complex of values" as
unrealistic, redundant or fully protected
by other recognized rights. He con-
cludes:
In sum, from all the welter of reasons
given in justification of the privilege
25 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52, 55 (1964).
2r384 U.S. 757 (1966). Cf. United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
2:335 U.S. 1 (1948).
2 Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
29 McKay, Self-incrimination and the New
Privacy, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 193.
against self-incrimination, it seems to me
that only two have any great probative
force, and they are perhaps opposite sides
of the same coin: (1) preservation of
official morality, and (2) preservation of
individual privacy.30
Many of the reasons offered by support-
ers of the privilege ignore "the real in-
terest of the state in securing evidence
otherwise possibly denied to it by the
successful plea of the privilege." 31
This analysis is fully supported by, and
facilitates synthesis of Gardner. The
Gardner formula protects the interest of
privacy, even that of the public employee,
by precluding surrender of it to the
sweeping stroke of a waiver of immunity
document-a Hobson's choice before a
single, specific question is asked. Offi-
cial morality is preserved by minimizing
the opportunity for the fishing expedition.
But surely the interest of privacy is
not absolute here and cannot extend to
the performance of official duties. The
interest of the state in securing evidence
of corruption is indeed real and the
means of obtaining such evidence is
critically limited as illustrated by the
frequent resort to wiretaps and informers.
When confronted with questions "speci-
fically, directly, and narrowly relating to
the performance of his official duties"
the public employee may choose to
escape criminal prosecution, and also
contempt, but he has no further interest
of privacy which demands his continu-
ance in public office. At the same time.
the state has been made to shoulder the
S0ld. at 213-14.
3l Id. at 214.
burden of establishing a foundation for
concrete, relevant interrogation. In the
context of Gardner, this last considera-
tion supports a relation of the privilege
to procedural due process beyond that
acknowledged by Dean McKay 32-an
assurance against short-cutting procedural
due process. If so, it is a fortunate if
nonetheless fortuitous consequence devel-
oping out of the inconclusiveness of the
right-to-hearing cases. 3  Gardner was
given an administrative hearing but
was discharged solely for refusing to sign
the waiver. Such a hearing is both in-
32 Id. at 208-09.
33 Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886 (1961); Bailey v. Richardson, 182
F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), afJ'd by an equally
divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
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sufficient and unnecessary. But the fact
of administrative disciplinary hearings,
with the attendant problems of over-zeal-
ousness, lack of separation of powers, and
limited judicial review, further supports
the relation of procedural due process to
the Gardner rationale.
With Gardner the Supreme Court has
removed uncertainty on an issue of public
importance. Mr. Justice Harlan, who dis-
sented vigorously in Garrity and Spevack,
concurred and welcomed the formula ad-
vanced by the Court. Mr. Justice Black
stands alone, concurring in the result
only. The Court has insured maximum
protection to the public employee without
stripping government of all opportunity to
protect its institutions against corrupt in-
fluence within.
